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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-1960 
____________ 
 
TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
TOTAL SYSTEMS INC; TOTSYS INC, 
 
                                                                             Appellants 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-01323) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 11, 2013 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges  
and STARK 
*
, District Judge 
 
(Filed: February 13, 2013 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
                                                 
     
*
  The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Total Systems, Inc. and Totsys, Inc. (collectively, Total Systems) appeal the 
District Court‘s summary judgment in favor of Transamerica Life Insurance Company.  
We will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the facts and procedural history essential to our decision. 
 The owners of Total Systems—Daniel Devine and Robert Hendrickson—applied 
for life insurance in December 1999.  Their agent, JB Hanauer, transmitted the 
applications to Transamerica through the Selario Agency, an independent insurance 
agency. 
 In June 2000, Transamerica approved Devine‘s application and issued him a life 
insurance policy with annual premiums of $2,390 and a benefit of $2,000,000.  Although 
Transamerica also approved Hendrickson‘s application, he began taking flying lessons in 
August 2000.  After learning this, Selario sent Transamerica a fax stating: ―Please reissue 
with Aviation Exclusion.  Insured started flying lessons Aug. 1, 2000 therefore we need 
the policy reissued with the Exclusion.‖  (App. 54.)  Selario also attached a Sports and 
Avocation Questionnaire, on which Hendrickson indicated that he had started taking 
flying lessons as a recreational pilot. 
 Transamerica quoted Hendrickson an annual premium of $2,700 for a $2,000,000 
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life insurance policy, which excluded coverage for death ―as a result of operating, riding 
in or descending from any kind of aircraft while the Insured is a crew member of that 
aircraft.‖  (App. 55–56.)  In case of such a death, Transamerica would remit only the 
premiums Hendrickson had already paid, with interest.  Hendrickson‘s premiums were 
higher than Devine‘s because his policy was issued at 2000, rather than 1999, rates.  
Transamerica also informed Selario that coverage without the aviation exclusion would 
have cost $3.50 per $1,000 of coverage, or $7,000 annually for the $2,000,000 of 
coverage. 
 On August 30, 2000, JB Hanauer told Selario to ―do the exclusion rider.‖  (App. 
206.)  Almost two weeks later, however, JB Hanauer told Selario that Hendrickson 
―doesn‘t want any policy.‖  (App. 208.)  On September 28, JB Hanauer sent another email 
to Selario stating that ―[Hendrickson]‘s back and wants to reopen and place the policy 
‗with the aviation exclusion.‘‖  (App. 210.) 
 In October 2000, Hendrickson submitted a new application for life insurance in 
which he answered ―yes‖ to the question whether he intended to fly an aircraft or had 
flown an aircraft in the past two years.  In the remarks section of the application, 
Hendrickson wrote: ―Issue w/ Aviation Exclusion.‖  (App. 122.)  JB Hanauer faxed the 
application to Selario and Transamerica, with instructions to ―[r]eissue w/ Aviation 
Exclusion.‖  (App. 204.) 
 There is no dispute that Transamerica issued a life insurance policy to 
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Hendrickson, although the parties disagree as to whether it contained an aviation 
exclusion.  Neither party produced the original insurance policy, but Transamerica 
presented in the District Court a Life Policy Invoice that refers to an ―AVTN EXCLSN.‖  
(App. 135.)  A Transamerica Operations Manager averred that every time the company 
issued a policy, a Life Policy Invoice would be generated automatically, and would be a 
―precise record of each of the forms, amendments and riders contained within the 
referenced policy.‖  (App. 48–49.) 
 In August 2007, Hendrickson died while piloting a private airplane.  On November 
5, 2007, Transamerica claims examiner Kim Melsha paid $2,003,888.36 in death benefits 
to Total Systems.  According to Melsha, she did not think to check the insurance policy 
for an aviation exclusion before paying the claim because she had never encountered such 
an exclusion before.  After paying Total Systems, Transamerica submitted a claim to its 
reinsurers, who alerted Transamerica to its potential mistake.  On January 2, 2008, 
Melsha sent Devine a letter requesting that Total Systems return $1,978,418.11 to 
Transamerica.  After Devine refused, Transamerica filed suit in the District Court to 
recover the alleged overpayment. 
 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, with each claiming that no 
material facts were in dispute and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
The District Court denied Total Systems‘s motion for summary judgment, granted 
Transamerica‘s motion, and ordered Total Systems to return $1,978,418.11.  Total 
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Systems filed this timely appeal, in which it argues, contrary to its position in the District 
Court, that material issues of fact exist such that summary judgment was improper. 
II
1
 
 We review de novo the District Court‘s summary judgment.  Slagle v. Cnty. of 
Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 263 (3d Cir. 2006).  Summary judgment should be granted ―if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute about 
any material fact exists ―if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.‖  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show that 
there is more than merely ―a scintilla of evidence‖ supporting his position, id. at 252, or 
―some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,‖ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).  In addition, a nonmoving party may not 
rely on ―unsupported allegations in his memorand[a] and pleadings . . . to repel summary 
judgment,‖ Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990), 
because the purpose of Rule 56 ―is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint 
or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit,‖ Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 
U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (―If a party fails to properly support 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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an assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the 
motion.‖). 
 To be entitled to recover its payment, Transamerica must demonstrate that 
Hendrickson‘s death was not covered by his insurance policy, and that a restitution order 
would not unduly prejudice Total Systems.  See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Yellen, 156 A.2d 
36, 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). 
III 
A 
 Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the District Court that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hendrickson‘s policy contained an 
aviation exclusion.  When Hendrickson began taking flying lessons in August 2000, 
Selario sent Transamerica a fax stating that Hendrickson ―started flying lessons Aug. 1, 
2000[;] therefore we need the policy reissued with the Exclusion.‖  In September, 
Hendrickson‘s broker sent an email to Transamerica stating that ―[Hendrickson]‘s back 
and wants to reopen and place the policy ‗with the aviation exclusion.‘‖  In October, 
Hendrickson submitted an application for life insurance to Transamerica, in which he 
handwrote: ―Issue w/ Aviation Exclusion.‖  When his agent faxed the application to 
Transamerica, the cover sheet contained instructions to ―[r]eissue w/ Aviation Exclusion.‖ 
 Finally, the Life Policy Invoice, the only contemporaneous record of Hendrickson‘s 
policy, mentions an ―AVTN EXCLSN‖ in its memo line. 
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 In an effort to rebut this evidence, Total Systems offers only the deposition 
testimony of Devine and Anthony DaCruz, an insurance agent at JB Hanauer.  We agree 
with the District Court that this testimony does not rebut Transamerica‘s documentary 
evidence.  Devine testified that he did not know whether Hendrickson ever considered 
purchasing a policy with an aviation exclusion.  When confronted with Hendrickson‘s 
application, Devine opined that the statement ―Issue w/ Aviation Exclusion‖ meant that 
Hendrickson ―ha[d] an issue with the aviation exclusion.‖  Devine also admitted that the 
Life Policy Invoice referred to an ―AVTN EXCLSN‖ and testified that he did not know 
whether he or Hendrickson had ever received the original policy. 
 Likewise, DaCruz testified based on his ―recollection‖ that he ―was under the 
impression that if Bob died in a plane crash, there was a payment to be made.‖  When 
confronted with Transamerica‘s documentary evidence, DaCruz admitted that the 
September email and the October fax suggested that Hendrickson was seeking a policy 
with an aviation exclusion. 
 The deposition testimony offered by Total Systems cannot defeat a motion for 
summary judgment when viewed in the light of the documentary evidence contradicting 
it.  See Ben-Kotel v. Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (summary 
judgment proper where two business records stating that an employee was hired in 1998 
were contradicted only by vague deposition testimony that employee was hired in 1999); 
see also Schoch, 912 F.2d at 657 (defendant‘s motion for summary judgment granted 
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because plaintiff‘s memorandum in opposition contained ―only contentions not supported 
by verified or documented materials‖).  Accordingly, summary judgment was proper. 
B 
 Total Systems next argues that Transamerica‘s documentary evidence was barred 
by the Best Evidence Rule, codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 1002.  Under that rule, 
―[a]n original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content unless these rules . . . 
provide[] otherwise.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 1002.  However, ―[a]n original is not required and 
other evidence of the content of a writing . . . is admissible if . . . all the originals are lost 
or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 1004. 
 In this case, the original insurance policy, which was issued to Hendrickson, was 
never produced in the District Court.  There is no evidence that Transamerica failed to 
retain a duplicate original in bad faith.  Therefore, Transamerica was permitted to 
introduce secondary evidence of the policy terms.  See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum 
Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992) (―Where the actual [insurance] policy is 
not available, the terms of the contract can also be shown by secondary evidence. . . . This 
type of secondary evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 1004 as long as 
the original contract has not been destroyed or lost in bad faith.‖). 
C 
 We also disagree with Total Systems‘s claim that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether it would be unduly prejudiced by a restitution order.  Under 
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New Jersey law, ―one who has paid money under a mistake of fact but for which payment 
would not have been made may have restitution from the payee notwithstanding that the 
mistake was unilateral and a consequence of the payor‘s negligence, providing, however, 
that such restitution will not prejudice the payee.‖  Great Am. Ins. Co., 156 A.2d at 39.  
To show prejudice, a payee must show that: 
[T]he payee‘s change in circumstances [is] detrimental to the payee, material 
and irrevocable and such that the payee cannot be placed in the status quo. . . . 
For example, the payee is not required to make restitution, if, by reason of the 
mistaken payment, he has assumed liabilities and obligations that he would not 
otherwise have assumed. 
 
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Levy, 680 A.2d 798, 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (citations 
omitted).  However, a payee cannot show prejudice merely by showing that he used the 
money to cover ordinary living expenses or pay preexisting debts, or that he failed to 
retain the overpayment.  Id. 
 In this case, the only evidence of prejudice that Total Systems presented was 
Devine‘s own affidavit.  Devine‘s affidavit states that, after receiving the insurance funds, 
he spent money on working capital, a new lease, new employees and their associated 
expenses, new hardware, travel and lodging expenses, a company car, and litigation 
expenses.  However, Total Systems has provided no evidence that document whether 
these expenses were extraordinary, when they occurred, or whether they were incurred in 
good-faith reliance on Transamerica‘s overpayment.  Because the purpose of Rule 56 ―is 
not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory 
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allegations of an affidavit,‖ Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888, Devine‘s bare-bones affidavit is 
insufficient to defeat summary judgment on the issue of prejudice.  This is particularly 
true here because Total Systems rebuffed Transamerica‘s discovery requests on this issue 
by asserting irrelevance and confidentiality. 
 For the reasons stated, we agree with the District Court that Total Systems failed to 
carry its burden to produce specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to prejudice.  See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 
1109 (3d Cir. 1985). 
D 
 Finally, Total Systems argues in passing that Transamerica‘s mistaken payment 
constituted a waiver of its contractual rights.  We disagree.  In the absence of reasonable, 
detrimental reliance by an insured, ―a loss which is not within the coverage of a policy 
cannot be brought within such coverage by invoking the principles of waiver or estoppel.‖ 
 Greenberg & Covitz v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 711 A.2d 909, 915–16 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (citation omitted), modified on other grounds by 
Greenberg & Covitz v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 569 (N.J. 1999).  Because 
Hendrickson‘s insurance policy did not cover the accident that took his life and because 
Total Systems has provided no evidence of detrimental reliance beyond Devine‘s 
unsupported affidavit, Transamerica‘s recovery is not barred by waiver. 
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IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
